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"LANDLORDS NEEDED, TOLERANCE PREFERRED": A CLASH OF
FAIRNESS AND FREEDOM IN FAIR HOUSING
COUNCIL v. ROOMMATES.COM
"Th[e] [Internet's] dynamic-jumbled, anonymous, instantaneous
communication-raises some fundamental questions; not least among
them those that challenge our comfortably settled understanding of the
First Amendment and our right to express ourselves freely."'
I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of the Internet has thoroughly changed the way our
society conducts business and engages in commerce.2 Billions of users can
buy, sell, and trade with an unprecedented level of ease and convenience.
3
With such accessibility and freedom available to so many users, abuses of
the various channels of communication are inevitable. 4 Many fear the In-
ternet has become a virtual wild west, a place where wrongdoers run ram-
pant without recourse. 5 Moreover, such abuses often conflict directly with
1. See Bruce W. Sanford & Michael J. Lorenger, Teaching an Old Dog New
Tiicks: The First Amendment in an Online World, 28 CONN. L. REv. 1137, 1140 (1996)
(describing Internet's legal implications on constitutional rights).
2. See Mark A. Lemley, Digital Rights Management: Rationalizing Internet Safe
Harbors, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101, 101 (2007) (describing vast
amount of commerce occurring on Internet with automatic processing of third-
party content). One commentator notes that from 1985 to 1995 alone, the num-
ber of host computers connected to the Internet rapidly increased from 1,000 to
approximately 4,000,000. See Paul H. Arne, New Wine in Old Bottles: The Developing
Law of the Internet, 416 PLI/PAT 9, 15 (1995) (acknowledging rapidly growing num-
ber of computers both using and providing access to Internet).
3. See Lemley, supra note 2, at 101-02 (indicating number of users and transac-
tions occurring on Internet).
4. SeeJon Burns, Doe v. SexSearch.com: Placing Real-Life Liability Back Where it
Belongs in a Virtual World, 9 N.C.J.L. & TECH. 69, 70-71 (2007) (describing various
abuses and horrors encountered on Internet). Some of the abuses include action
fraud, non-delivery, check fraud, credit or debit card fraud, computer fraud, confi-
dence fraud, financial institutions fraud, identity theft, investment fraud, and child
pornography. See NAT'L WHITE COLLAR CRIME CTR. & FBI, 2006 INTERNET CRIME
REPORT 3 (2006), available at http://www.ic3.gov/media/annualreport/2006-IC3
Report.pdf (outlining various crimes committed on Internet in 2006 and extent of
these crimes' occurrences).
5. See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th
Cir. 2008) (en banc) (discussing potential for Internet to become "a lawless no-
man's-land"); see also Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 48 (D.D.C. 1998)
(describing Internet as lacking territorial boundaries with "'no there there,' the
'there' is everywhere there is Internet access." (citing Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista
Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 462 (D. Mass. 1997))); Assaf Hamdani, Who's Liable
For Cyberwrongs?, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 901, 902 (2002) (stating that "the booms and
busts of the Internet have been accompanied by new opportunities . . .and new
challenges for law enforcement"); Sanford & Lorenger, supra note 1, at 1141
(337)
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our legal system, including legislation designed to protect our country's
deepest values.
6
Specifically, some Internet abusers are practicing housing discrimina-
tion through the use of online housing advertising, an activity that con-
flicts with the Fair Housing Act (FHA). 7 In the wake of the civil tights
movement of the 1960s, Congress passed the FLA to prevent discrimina-
tory practices by individuals selling or renting homes. 8 Although not al-
ways effective, the FHA was a major breakthrough in protecting the rights
of minorities.9 Yet with the passage of time, new technology is providing
an expanding playing field for discrimination, one that is difficult to
regulate.10
As a response to the growing and unpredictable nature of the In-
ternet, Congress passed the Communications Decency Act (CDA), which
(describing Internet as lacking "gatekeepers" who control distribution of
information).
6. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2006) (prohibiting "by means of a telecommuni-
cations device . . .any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other
communication which is obscene or child pornography, with intent to annoy,
abuse, threaten, or harass another person"); 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000) (restricting
.any communication for commercial purposes that is available to any minor and
that includes any material that is harmful to minors"), invalidated by ACLU v. Ash-
croft, 322 F.3d 240, 247 (3d Cir. 2003).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006). SeeJennifer C. Chang, Note, In Search ofFairHous-
ing in Cyberspace: The Implications of the Communications Decency Act for Fair Housing on
the Internet, 55 STAN. L. REV 969, 1010 (2002) (acknowledging that "[s]ince the
passage of the Fair Housing Act ... the astronomical growth of the Internet has
anointed cyberspace the newest battleground in the struggle to make equal access
and diversity a reality in American neighborhoods").
8. See § 3604 (protecting classes of individuals from housing discrimination).
The FHA specifically prohibits discrimination of individuals based on race, color,
religion, sex, familial status, disability, and national origin. See id. (prohibiting dis-
crimination of specified classes of people). An amendment to the FHA in 2005
added sexual orientation as an additional protected class. See H.R. 288, 109th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2005). For a general discussion of studies that have analyzed the
cause of rental discrimination, see Robert G. Schwemm, Why Do Landlords Still Dis-
criminate (And What Can Be Done About It)?, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 455, 475-85
(2007).
9. SeeJeffery M. Sussman, Note, Cyberspace: An Emerging Safe Haven for Housing
Discrimination, 19 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 194, 195-96 (2007) (discussing ongoing
housing discrimination despite government's thirty-year history of enforcing
FHA). In 2006 alone, 10,328 complaints were filed with the Office of Housing and
Urban Development regarding allegations of housing discrimination. See U.S.
DEPT. OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., THE STATE OF FAIR HOUSING, FY 2006 ANNUAL RE-
PORT ON FAIR HOUSING 3 (2007), available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/fy
2006rpt.pdf (indicating number of housing discrimination incidents). Addition-
ally, the number of reported incidents of housing discrimination steadily increased
from 1998 to 2006. See id. (indicating current trends in housing discrimination
incidents).
10. See Rachel Kurth, Note, Striking a Balance Between Protecting Civil Rights and
Free Speech on the Internet: The Fair Housing Act vs. The Communications Decency Act, 25
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 805, 819 (2007) (detailing difficulty of policing Internet
and regulating its uses).
[Vol. 54: p. 337
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contains a section providing Internet Service Providers (ISPs) immunity
from liability for illicit content posted by third parties. 1 ISPs provide a
variety of online services; in particular, a number of ISPs provide a conve-
nient means for homeowners and landlords to advertise properties for sale
and for rental. 12 Certain users of these services have taken advantage of
the unrestricted nature of the Internet by posting housing advertisements
that may discriminate against minorities.1 3 Consequently, a debate has
emerged over whether ISPs are responsible for curbing illicit content,
such as discriminatory housing postings, or whether they are immune
from liability in order to promote the unfettered and unhindered growth
of the Internet.
14
Since the passage of the CDA, courts have generally held ISPs im-
mune from liability for content posted by third party users.1 5 Recently,
however, the Ninth Circuit in Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.cor 1 6 held
Roommates.com, an online housing service provider, liable for discrimina-
tory housing advertisements posted by its subscribers. 17 This narrow inter-
pretation of the CDA's immunity provision may have dire consequences
for ISPs, creating additional possibilities of liability for them.'"
This Note discusses interpretations of the CDA and concludes that
the holding in Roommates.com, finding an ISP liable for third-party content,
11. SeeBatzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026-30 (9th Cir. 2003) (detailing back-
ground leading to adoption of CDA).
12. See Chang, supra note 7, at 970-72 (discussing rapid expansion of Internet
and online housing related services).
13. See Jerry Berman & Daniel J. Weitzner, Abundance and User Control: Re-
newing the Democratic Heart of the First Amendment in the Age of Interactive Media, 104
YALE L.J. 1619, 1623-24 (1995) (noting that Internet's "decentralized nature of in-
formation distribution generates substantially lower barriers to entry for indepen-
dent information [content] providers").
14. See Kurth, supra note 10, at 806 (describing tension between two Congres-
sional acts); see also, Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164
(9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (examining situation where FHA and CDA collide in
court). For a comprehensive study of the problems faced when determining liabil-
ity in the online world, see Hamdani, supra note 5, at 902-58. One commentator
noted that "the Internet was the equivalent of two tin cans and a string when the
Fair Housing Act was passed back in 1968." Chang, supra note 7, at 970 (quoting
Bill Pietrucha, HUD Takes Housing Discrimination Battle to Net, NEwsBYrEs, Apr. 14,
1998).
15. See Christopher Butler, Plotting the Return of an Ancient Tort to Cyberspace:
Towards a New Federal Standard of Responsibility for Defamation for Internet Service Prov-
iders, 6 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. Rrv. 247, 248 (2000) (explaining that, gener-
ally, in decisions after the enactment of CDA, federal courts interpreted Act to bar
virtually all liability from acts from third-party users, such as defamation).
16. 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
17. See id. at 1165 (finding that CDA did not bar liability to Roommates.com
for illegal content).
18. See id. at 1167-68 (finding exception to CDA immunity when ISP contrib-
utes in part to objectionable content posted on Internet).
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is inconsistent with the CDA's adoptive purpose.1 9 Additionally, this Note
argues that the importance of both unrestricted growth of commerce and
free speech on the Internet counsels against requiring ISPs to censor
third-party content such as housing advertisements. 20 Part II summarizes
the history and background of both the FHA and the CDA. 21 Next, Part
III examines the circumstances giving rise to Roommates.com, investigates
the Ninth Circuit's approach in determining liability for certain ISPs when
third party advertisements violate the FHA, and summarizes the dissent's
findings. 22 Part TV compares and contrasts the Ninth Circuit's approach
in Roommates.com with that of the Seventh Circuit in Chicago Lawyers' Com-
mittee for Civil Rights Under Law v. Craigslist,23 examines conclusions in law,
and analyzes the impact of Ninth Circuit's holding.24 Finally, Part V con-
cludes that Roommates. com will negatively impact the Internet's growth and
functionality.
25
I. POURING THE LEGISLATIVE FOUNDATION: THE LEGAL HISTORY
AND BACKGROUND
The call for fair housing legislation grew out of the civil rights move-
ment and its attack on segregation and discriminatory housing practices.2 6
Specifically, the FHA was adopted to enforce equal housing opportuni-
ties.27 Later, the rise of the Internet created the need for additional legis-
19. For a discussion of why Roommates.com's holding is inconsistent with Con-
gressional intentions in passing § 230, see infra notes 146-49 and accompanying
text.
20. For a discussion that concludes that unfettered growth of the Internet
outweighs the need to filter housing advertisements, see infra notes 157-59 and
accompanying text.
21. For a general discussion of the history of the Fair Housing Act, see infra
notes 26-46 and accompanying text. For a general discussion of the history of the
Communications Decency Act, see infra notes 47-67 and accompanying text.
22. For a general discussion of the facts giving rise to Roommates. com, see infra
notes 68-80 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's meth-
odology in determining liability to ISPs for third-party content in Roommates.com,
see infra notes 81-106 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the dissenting
opinion in Roommates.com, see infra notes 107-19 and accompanying text.
23. 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008).
24. For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Craigslist and a com-
parison with the Ninth Circuit's decision in Roommates.com, see infra notes 120-39
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the conclusions in law stemming from
both the Roommates. com decision and the Craigslist decision, see infra notes 140-49
and accompanying text. For a discussion of Roommates.com's future impact on the
state of the Internet, see infra notes 150-68 and accompanying text.
25. For a general discussion of this Note's concluding remarks, see infra notes
169-74 and accompanying text.
26. For a general discussion of the background of the FHA, see infra notes 26-
46 and accompanying text.
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006) (preventing individuals from discriminating
in renting and selling property).
[Vol. 54: p. 337
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lation to protect Internet service providers from excessive liability. 28
Thus, § 230 of the CDA was adopted to limit liability as to these service
providers for illegal content created by their users.29 The backgrounds
and goals of these acts have led to interpretations that have caused colli-
sions in the courts. 30
A. Constructing Equal Housing Opportunities: The Fair Housing Act
The unfair treatment of minorities in the United States stretches back
at least as far as the country's founding, and is attributable to the historical
exploitation of African American slaves. 3 1 After the Civil War, the rights
of newly freed slaves were limited as a result of discrimination, primarily in
the southern states. 32 In response, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of
1866, aiming to protect the rights of citizens "of every race and color, with-
out regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude." 33
Despite these efforts, segregated housing practices continued through the
turn of the twentieth century.3 4
28. For a general discussion of the background of the CDA, see infra notes 47-
67 and accompanying text.
29. See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000) (immunizing ISPs from liability for publishing
content produced by individual users).
30. See Kurth, supra note 10, at 806 (stating that "[a] tension exists between
the goals of Congressional legislation, such as the Fair Housing Act, designed to
protect individuals from unfair discrimination, and the Communications Decency
Act, which seeks to promote freedom of the Internet by protecting host Web sites
from liability for the posts of their users").
31. See Schwemm, supra note 8, at 498 (citing GLENN C. LouRY, THE ANATOMY
OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 5 (2002)) (finding that "awareness of the racial 'otherness'
of blacks is embedded in the social consciousness owing to the historical fact of
slavery and its aftermath").
32. See STEPHEN GRANT MEYER, As LONG As THEY DON'T MOVE NEXT DOOR:
SEGREGATION AND RACIAL CONFLICT IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 13-15 (2000)
(discussing state of racial relations during period after Civil War). Many states,
primarily in the South, adopted "Black Codes" that served to control the rights of
African Americans and restrict their freedoms. See Jessica McElrath, The Black
Codes of 1865, ABOUT.COM, http://afroamhistory.about.com/od/blackcodes/a/
blackcodesl865.htm (detailing provisions of Black Codes). For example, Missis-
sippi required that the newly freed slaves could not become lessees anywhere in
the state except for in towns and cities. See ELLIS PAXSON OBERHOLTZER, A HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE CIVIL WAR VOL. 1128 (1936) (noting Black Codes
as method by which white leaders maintained control over newly freed slaves).
33. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 32, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27-30 (1866).
34. See MEYER, supra note 32, at 1-2 (discussing state of housing segregation in
first half of twentieth century). The National Association of Real Estate Boards
(NAREB) taught its members in the real estate industry to avoid racial mixing in
residential neighborhoods. See Kurth, supra note 10, at 807 (discussing real estate
industry's involvement in promoting segregation). Local governments contrib-
uted to segregation by enacting zoning ordinances enforcing restrictive covenants
that prevented integrated neighborhoods. See id. (discussing local govemments'
practices in preventing integration in neighborhoods). Private citizens have addi-
tionally played a part in segregation by making pacts to refuse to sell homes to
African-Americans. See id. (acknowledging contributions of private citizens toward
proliferation of housing segregation).
2009] NOTE
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In 1948, the Supreme Court, in Shelley v. Kraemer,3 5 determined that
deliberate housing segregation covenants, as enforced by any government
entity, including the courts, constituted a denial of equal protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment.36 Still, through the 1960s, some individuals
persistently sought ways to circumvent the Kraemer ruling, effectively con-
tinuing to perpetuate housing segregation. 37 Racial tensions grew, with
violence erupting during the civil rights movement, and fair housing be-
coming a primary focus of the movement. 38 Eventually, Congress passed
35. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
36. See id. at 23 (holding housing covenants promoting discrimination against
minorities unconstitutional). The Supreme Court found that race-based restrictive
covenants on the ownership of property are not themselves violations of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but that state court enforce-
ment of the covenants is a violation. See id. at 8-9 (holding government participa-
tion in promoting discrimination unconstitutional). The Court has additionally
found that statutes barring occupancy by African-Americans violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668, 668 (1927) (holding that land-
lord's refusal to rent property to minority tenants violated Fourteenth Amend-
ment); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917) (holding that intent of
ordinance to prevent alienation of property to person of color was not legitimate
exercise of state police power); see also Glover v. Atlanta, 96 S.E. 562, 563 (Ga.
1918) (holding that ordinance preventing persons of color from buying lots in
white-dominated locations was unconstitutional); Jackson v. State, 103 A. 910, 911
(Md. 1918) (holding that ordinance seeking to make ownership or occupancy of
property in particular localities dependent on race of persons was unconstitutional
attempt to limit property rights of individuals on account of race); Clinard v. Win-
ston-Salem, 6 S.E.2d 867, 870 (N.C. 1940) (holding that ordinance prohibiting
landowners from selling or leasing property to certain races was unconstitutional);
Allen v. Okla. City, 52 P.2d 1054, 1058 (Okla. 1935) (enjoining city from enforcing
ordinance prohibiting black persons from purchasing lots in area where majority
of residences were occupied by white persons); Liberty Annex Corp. v. Dallas, 289
S.W. 1067, 1069-70 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) (holding city-adopted ordinance
designating areas in city for occupancy by various racial groups void); Irvine v.
Clifton Forge, 97 S.E. 310, 310 (Va. 1918) (holding city segregation ordinance in
conflict with Fourteenth Amendment and therefore void).
37. See Leonard S. Rubinowitz & Ismail Alsheik, A Missing Piece: Fair Housing
and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 48 How. L.J. 841, 872-74 (2005) (identifying continu-
ing discrimination in housing despite court rulings in 1960s). The finite number
of fair housing cases indicates that civil rights litigators focused with greater inten-
sity on resolving more visible issues such as segregation in schools, voting rights,
and public transportation discrimination. See id. at 872 (discussing limited court
rulings on fair housing issues). In one case, after popular musician Nat King Cole
purchased a home in a wealthy Los Angeles neighborhood, white neighbors at-
tempted to take back the property and planted signs on the lawn reading "Nigger
Heaven." See MEYER, supra note 32, at 94-95 (describing outrageous practices white
individuals undertook to maintain housing segregation in certain neighborhoods).
38. See MrYR, supra note 32, at 117 (describing state of unrest during civil
fights movement). Violence erupted across the country as white neighborhoods
reacted to the forced integration mandated by the Supreme Court. See id.
(describing response to mandated integration by individuals seeking status quo).
At that time, the city of Chicago endured three bombings, ten arson incidents, and
eighty-one incidents of terror and intimidation toward black individuals. See id. at
118 (indicating extreme measure of violence individuals practiced in one city to-
ward minorities).
6
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the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which proved to be a major breakthrough in
the reduction of segregation, but which provided few provisions for the
enforcement of fair housing.3
9
In 1968, at the behest of President Lyndon B. Johnson, Congress en-
acted Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act, also known as the Fair Housing
Act.40 The FHA expressly prohibits the refusal to "rent after the making
of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the . . . rental of, or
otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of
race, color ... or national origin."4 ' Additionally, § 3604(c) of the FHA
prohibits the following:
To make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or pub-
lished any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to
the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, lim-
itation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex,
handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an intention to
make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination. 42
This provision expressly creates liability for publishers who propagate
housing advertisements that are discriminatory in nature. 43 The statute
39. See Rubinowitz & Alsheik, supra note 37, at 841-42 (discussing lack of en-
forcement for fair housing stemming from Civil Rights Act of 1964). In addressing
Congress after taking office, President Johnson stated: "I urge you, as I did in 1957
and again in 1960, to enact a civil rights law so that we can move forward to elimi-
nate from this nation every trace of discrimination based on race or color." See
Ted Gittinger & Allen Fisher, LBJ Champions the Civil Rights Act of 1964, PROLOGUE,
Summer 2004, at 10, 15, available at http://www.archives.gov/publications/pro-
logue/2004/summer/civil-ights-act-1 .html.
40. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2006).
41. § 3604(a). The latter portion of the statute has proven substantial
enough to render the "bona fide offer" requirement of little significance in the
enforcement of the Act. See Schwemm, supra note 8, at 461 n.24 (citing ROBERT G.
SCHWEMM, HOUSING DIsCiuMINATION: LAw AND LITIGATION, app. C (2006)). Courts
have recognized one notable exception to § 3604(a), known as the "Mrs. Murphy"
exception, which states that discrimination is acceptable by an owner that lives at
the home and rents to no more than three other people or families. SeeJames D.
Walsh, Reaching Mrs. Murphy: A Call for Repeal of the Mrs. Murphy Exemption to the Fair
Housing Act, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 605, 605-06 (1999) (outlining exception to
§ 3604(a) in which discrimination practiced by individual homeowners is not nec-
essarily illegal).
42. § 3604(c). It should be noted that the "Mrs. Murphy" exception does not
apply to discriminatory advertisements under § 3604(c). See Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1835,
1886 (2006) (noting that "permitting Mrs. Murphy landlords to publish discrimi-
natory advertisements 'created a public impression that segregation in housing is
legal, thus facilitating discrimination by... other property owners and requiring a
consequent increase in [civil rights] organizations' educational programs on the
illegality of housing discrimination.'" (quoting Spann v. Colonial Vill., Inc., 899
F.2d 24, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1990))). For a general explanation of the "Mrs. Murphy"
exception, see Walsh, supra note 41, at 605-06.
43. See Diane J. Klein & Charles Doskow, Housingdiscriminatian.com?: The Ninth
Circuit (Mostly) Puts Out The Welcome Mat For Fair Housing Suits Against Roommate-
7
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further aims to help promote integrated communities and encourage
members of protected classes to freely pursue housing opportunities. 44 In
their effort to enforce § 3604(c), courts have since held that the provision
applies to an assortment of media.45 Yet with the rise of the Internet and
the CDA, Congress has expressed an intention to treat online media
differently. 46
B. Insulating the Internet's Growth: The Communications Decency Act
With the rapid expansion of the Internet in the 1990s, there emerged
an increased concern that obscene content such as pornography would be
easily accessed and distributed.4 7 Accordingly, in 1995, Congress passed
Matching Websites, 38 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 329, 335 (2008) (discussing meaning
behind § 3604(c) of FHA). Those found liable under § 3604(c) generally include
both those individuals who originate the unlawful content by writing the discrimi-
natory advertisements and additionally those who publish the advertisements. See
id. (identifying individuals who traditionally are held liable under FHA provision).
44. See Hous. Opportunities Made Equal v. Cincinnati Enquirer, 943 F.2d 644,
652 (6th Cir. 1990) (discussing purpose of FHA "to eradicate housing discrimina-
tion and to promote integrated housing"). The Sixth Circuit stated that
"[w]ithout the regulation of advertisements, realtors could deter certain classes of
potential tenants from seeking housing at a particular location, effectively discrimi-
nating against these classes without running afoul of the FHA's prohibition against
discriminatory housing practices." Id. (describing reasoning behind addition of
§ 3604(c) of FHA). The Fourth Circuit has stated that the "[w]idespread appear-
ance of discriminatory advertisements in public or private media may reasonably
be thought to have a harmful effect on the general aims of the Act; seeing large
numbers of 'white only' advertisements in one part of a city may deter nonwhites
from venturing to seek homes there." United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 214
(4th Cir. 1972) (recognizing vast potential of harm from discriminatory
advertising).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Space Hunters, Inc., 429 F.3d 416, 420 (2d Cir.
2005) (holding that housing service that treated disabled people differently from
non-disabled people violated FHA); Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 999-
1000 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding that newspaper publication of housing advertise-
ments consisting of models of potential customers of particular race could indicate
racial preference); Hunter, 459 F.2d at 211 (holding that newspaper publishing
classified advertisement for apartment rental denominated as "white home" vio-
lated FHA); Fair Hous. Cong. v. Weber, 993 F. Supp. 1286, 1289-91 (C.D. Cal.
1997) (finding that apartment complex rule restricting children's play activities
even when they were not causing unnecessary noise or annoying anyone violated
FHA); Saunders v. Gen. Servs. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1042, 1057-69 (E.D. Va. 1987)
(holding that advertising brochure depicting apartment complexes with only white
individuals in photos violated FHA); Wheatley Heights Neighborhood Coal. v.
Jenna Resales Co., 447 F. Supp. 838, 842 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding that real
estate listing service could violate FHA if causal nexus is shown between service
activities and racial steering).
46. For a general discussion of the background of the CDA, see infra notes 47-
67 and accompanying text.
47. See Kurth, supra note 10, at 818 (pointing to surveys stating that Internet
ballooned from 40 million users in 1996 to 513.41 million users in 2001). A 1994
Dateline NBC story about online pedophiles and generally "disgusting material"
on the Internet sparked an intense reaction and calls for regulation. See Ken S.
Myers, Wikimmunity: Fitting the Communications Decency Act to Wikipedia, 20 HARv. J.L.
[Vol. 54: p. 337
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an amendment to Title V of the Telecommunications Act, also known as
the Communications Decency Act, which provided sanctions for anyone
who "(i) makes, creates, solicits, and (ii) initiates the transmission of any
. . . communication which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or inde-
cent."48 That same year, the Supreme Court of Nassau County, New York,
in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,4 9 found online service prov-
iders to be content publishers rather than distributers, leading it to hold
Prodigy Services liable for not filtering defamatory comments posted by a
user.50 Yet Stratton Oakmont was decided on seemingly paradoxical logic:
online service providers that voluntarily filtered some content could be
held liable, whereas those that ignored all objectionable content escaped
liability. 5 1 The fear of the backlash of liability to service providers created
& TECH. 163, 172 (2006) (discussing news story about online pedophiles contribut-
ing to changes in Internet legislation). The NBC Dateline story led SenatorJames
Exon to propose a law that would stand alone in an attempt to "'modernize' ob-
scenity regulation 'for the digital world'"; ultimately, the law was not passed. See id.
(discussing first attempts at regulation of obscenities on Internet). Other com-
plaints of deviant behavior extensively reported include fraud, identity theft, espio-
nage, and intellectual property infringements. See NAT'L WHITE COLLAR CRIME
CTR. & FBI, 2006 INTERNET CRIME REPORT 3 (2006), available at http://www.ic3.
gov/media/annualreport/2006_IC3Report.pdf.
48. See 47 U.S.C. § 223. The primary goal of the Act, introduced by Senator
James Exon of Nebraska, was to regulate the exposure of minors to indecent mate-
rial. See Communications Decency Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104, Title V, 110 Stat. 56,
133-39 (1996); see also H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 81-91 (1996); S. REP. No. 104-230,
at 187-93 (1996); S. REP. No. 104-23, at 9 (1995). The sanctions were to be regu-
lated by the FCC. See CHARLES A. GIMON, INFO NATION, ExoN AMENDMENT
PASSES THE SENATE, available at http://www.gimonca.com/personal/archive/exon.
html (recounting method of enforcement of original CDA).
49. No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), abro-
gated by 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
50. See id. at *17-18 (holding online service provider liable as publisher of
content provided by third-party user). One who repeats or republishes a libel is
subject to liability as a "publisher" as if he or she had published it originally. See id.
at *6 (discussing plaintiff's burden to establish liability for libel). In contrast, a
"distributor" such as a book store or library only can be liable for defamatory state-
ments if they knew or had reason to know of the specific statements at issue. See id.
(detailing condition to establish liability for distributor). Although Prodigy had
shown that it had the ability to filter user content, it did not apply that ability in all
situations. See id. at *9 (describing Prodigy's capability of controlling user content
through selective filtering). The court followed the reasoning of the Southern
District of New York in Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., where an ISP was not found
liable because it had little control over the content that the users provided. See id.
(citing Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)).
Because Prodigy had filtered some objectionable material, the court found that
the service had control of the content, and was therefore liable as a publisher for
controlling the access to the material. See Prodigy, 1995 WL 323710, at *17-18 (find-
ing ISP liable for all objectionable user content due to service's past regulation of
content).
51. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir.
2008) (en banc) (discussing implications for ISPs following Prodigy). In discussing
Stratton Oakmont, Representative Christopher Cox stated: "The court said .... 'You
... are going to face higher, stricker [sic] liability because you tried to exercise
2009] NOTE 345
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a substantial disincentive for ISPs to create filtering software for illicit
content.
52
Recognizing the implications of Stratton Oakmont, Congress passed
§ 230 of the Telecommunications Act. 53 In that section, Congress specifi-
cally stated its intentions for adopting the Act by including policy goals
such as "promot[ing] the continued development of the Internet" and
"preserv[ing] the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists
for the Internet."54 Most significantly, § 230(c)(1) states that "[n]o pro-
vider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider."55 Accordingly, this passage has been recognized by
some control over the offensive material.' Mr. Chairman, that is backward." 141
CONG. REc. H8469-70 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox) (indicating
reverse logic in Stratton Oakmont decision, which led to passage of § 230
amendment).
52. See Myers, supra note 47, at 173 (finding that holding Prodigy liable for
defamatory content in Stratton Oakmont created disincentive to produce software
that permits user comments); see also 141 CONG. REc. H8469-70 (daily ed. Aug. 4,
1995) (statement of Rep. Cox) (discussing reasoning behind push for legislation
for protection of ISPs from liability for third-party content posted online).
53. See Stephen Collins, Saving Fair Housing on the Internet: The Case For Amend-
ing the Communications Decency Act, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 1471, 1479-82 (2008) (noting
that Stratton Oakmont's implications caused push for legislation to protect ISPs
from liability stemming from third-party content). Section 230 was introduced
into the House by Representatives Christopher Cox of California and Ron Wyden
of Oregon due to their concerns for "hamper[ing] the development of the In-
ternet." See 141 CONG. REC. H8471 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Cox). Section 230 focused on alleviating the burden on ISPs that serve third-par-
ties who post content. See Kurth, supra note 10, at 821 (discussing Congress's rea-
soning in addressing Internet publication issue).
54. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2000). Specifically, Congress listed the goals of the
statute:
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other
interactive computer services and other interactive media;
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently
exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered
by Federal or State regulation;
(3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user
control over what information is received by individuals, families, and
schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer services;
(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of block-
ing and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their chil-
dren's access to objectionable or inappropriate online material; and
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and
punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of
computer.
Id. (outlining policy goals of § 230). Congress hoped that tying this "get out of
liability free" card to good faith attempts to block illicit content would allow web-
sites to develop and use self-regulatory technologies. See Recent Case, Texas District
Court Extends § 230 Immunity to Social Networking Sites, 121 HARV. L. REv. 930, 931
n.12 (2008) (discussing Congress's motivation in adopting § 230).
55. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (1).
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some courts as providing immunity from liability to ISPs to the extent that
they only publish information provided by a third party.56
Finding such liability hinges on whether the ISP is determined to be
an "interactive computer service" or "information content provider."57
The Act defines an "interactive computer service" as "any information ser-
vice, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer
access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a ser-
vice or system that provides access to the Internet."5 8 In contrast, § 230
defines an "information content provider" as "any person or entity that is
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of infor-
mation provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer
service." 59 Courts are therefore left with the dilemma of deciding
whether, under the purposes of the CDA's immunity clause, a website is an
"information content provider" acting as a developer or merely an "inter-
active computer service" acting as a "publisher."60 The greater the ser-
vice's role in providing content, the greater potential for liability to the
service.
6 1
In 1997, the Supreme Court found that the amendments to § 223,
referring to lewd content, violated the First Amendment and were thus
unconstitutional; the amendments made to § 230, however, continue to
be enforced. 62 Since the passage of § 230, case law has been generally
56. See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (find-
ing that § 230 "precludes courts from entertaining claims that would place a com-
puter service provider in a publisher's role"). Zeran was the first decision on the
matter since the passage of § 230; the holding began the era of broad immunity
for ISPs. See Sussman, supra note 9, at 203-04 (discussing beginning of courts' rec-
ognition of § 230 immunity toward ISPs). For a general discussion analyzing the
background case law on ISP liability and finding consistency in the courts' hold-
ings, see id. at 203-07.
57. See Burns, supra note 4, at 73-74 (explaining that "[t]he central issue that
courts confront when applying the CDA for purposes of immunity is the breadth of
the definitions of 'information content provider' and 'publisher' as two key terms
within the CDA").
58. See § 230(f) (2) (defining interactive computer service).
59. See § 230(f) (3) (defining information content provider).
60. See Burns, supra note 4, at 73-74 (discussing dilemma for courts in deter-
mining liability). The courts use the term "in whole or in part" to clarify the
breadth of the immunity provided by the statute. See id. at 74 (discussing key term
used to identify potential liability for ISPs).
61. See id. (explaining that "[t]he greater extent to which an interactive com-
puter service-which could be an ISP such as America Online... or a website such
as Craigslist-is seen to be merely a publisher of information from a third-party
information content provider . . . the greater the immunity from liability"). A
court is left to decide in the continuum between two extreme readings of the stat-
ute: (1) a service is liable so long as it is responsible for any part of the develop-
ment; or (2) a service is not liable so long as a third-party is responsible for any
part of the development. See id. (discussing expansive potential readings courts
must consider when making judgments on § 230 immunity).
62. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871-72 (1997) (finding that vagueness of
§ 223 posed "chilling effect on free speech" that raised special First Amendment
concerns). The Court noted that this section, which prohibited "obscene or inde-
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consistent in finding a comparatively expansive definition of "interactive
computer service" and a narrow definition of "interactive content pro-
vider."63 The Ninth Circuit exemplified these interpretations in Carafano
v. Metrosplash.com, Inc.,64 holding that an Internet matchmaker was not an
information content provider because none of its matchmaking profiles
had any content until a user actively created it.65 The court noted that
"the fact that Matchmaker classifies user characteristics into discrete cate-
gories and collects responses to specific essay questions does not transform
Matchmaker into a 'developer' of the 'underlying misinformation.'
6 6
Thus, leading up to Roommates.com, the Ninth Circuit, like other courts,
had generally held ISPs immune from liability for content posted by third
parties.
67
III. ROOMMATES.COM: BUILT ON SHAKY GROUND?
A. Framing the Case: The Facts and Procedure
Roommates.com is a for-profit ISP that hosts a website that allows in-
dividuals to advertise spare rooms for other individuals to rent.68 The ser-
vice has accumulated over 150,000 active postings, and receives roughly
cent" communications to minors, "effectively suppresses a large amount of speech
that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another."
Id. at 874 (finding burden on adult speech to be "unacceptable if less restrictive
alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that
the statute was enacted to serve"); see also United States v. Playboy Entm't. Group,
529 U.S. 803, 826-27 (2000) (finding that § 561 of Telecommunications Act of
1996 contained content-based restrictions that violated First Amendment).
63. See Sussman, supra note 9, at 207 (stating that although debate continues
as to whether "the broad definition of 'interactive computer service' and the nar-
row definition of 'information content provider' reflect Congress's intention when
it passed § 230, there appears to be uniformity across court reasoning").
64. 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003).
65. See id. at 1124-25 (finding that "Matchmaker did not play a significant role
in creating, developing or 'transforming' the relevant information"). Although
Matchmaker provided a menu of pre-prepared responses to users, the court found
that Matchmaker lacked responsibility for the "underlying misinformation." See id.
(finding that providing pre-prepared responses to users does not render service an
Internet content provider).
66. See id. at 1124 (finding ISP to be immune from liability without creating
any content). The court noted that "despite the serious and utterly deplorable
consequences that occurred in this case, we conclude that Congress intended that
service providers such as Matchmaker be afforded immunity from suit." Id. at 1125
(recognizing that negative implications cannot override Congress's purposes).
67. See Butler, supra note 15, at 248 (describing how courts generally find that
CDA grants ISPs immunity from liability from third-party content).
68. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir.
2008) (en banc) (discussing services that Roommates.com provides). The service
has both a free service and an upgraded service requiring a monthly fee that pro-
vides additional features. See id. at 1162 (describing types of subscriptions available
to users). Subscribers to the upgraded service could read emails from other users
and view other subscribers' "Additional Comments." See id. (differentiating types
of subscriptions available to Roommates.com users).
[Vol. 54: p. 337
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one million hits a day from Internet users. 69 Part of the service's objective
is to address and capitalize upon the inherent difficulties and inefficien-
cies in the roommate selection process. 70 To become a member of Room-
mates.com, each subscriber is required to answer a series of questions
including the subscriber's contact information, such as name, email ad-
dress, and availability. 71 Further, a "Housing Description" section requires
each subscriber to specify their gender, occupation, level of cleanliness,
smoking habits, the total number of occupants in the home, and whether
children or pets are present.7 2
Additionally, users can optionally select desired characteristics in a
roommate, including age range, gender, and level of cleanliness. 73 Fi-
nally, the service provides an optional "Additional Comments" section,
where users can describe themselves and indicate personal preferences in
an open-ended form.7 " The service then compiles all of the user's infor-
mation into a "profile page" that displays the user's name, description,
and preferences as answered in the questionnaire. 75
69. See id. at 1161 (discussing widespread use of Roommates.com service).
70. See Klein & Doskow, supra note 43, at 335-36 (describing inefficiency of
targeting housing advertising). Bryan Peters of Roommate.com testified that "[b]y
referencing... beliefs in their profiles, users avoid the need to contact and inter-
view dozens of incompatible people." See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Val-
ley v. Roommates.com, 489 F.3d 921, 932 (9th Cir. 2007) (Reinhardt, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
71. See Roommates.corn, 521 F.3d at 1180-81 (McKeown,J., dissenting) (describ-
ing user and housing information that Roommates.com's service required of
users).
72. See id. at 1181 (describing additional information that Roommates.com
service requested). The service made no request for information regarding the
users' race or religion. See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Room-
mate.com, No. 03-09386PA(RZX), 2004 IAL 3799488, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30,
2004) (noting that Roommate.com did not request certain types of information).
73. See Roommates.corn, 521 F.3d at 1181 (McKeownJ., dissenting) (describing
section on website where users could optionally enter roommate preferences).
74. See id. at 1161 (majority opinion) (describing additional section where
users could optionally enter any information in free form).
75. See id. at 1161-62 (describing how user information is utilized on Room-
mates.com service). Under the terms of service, Roommates.com informed all
users that it does not screen their postings and that the users are "entirely responsi-
ble" for the information they post on the website. See Roommate.com, No. 03-
09386PA(RZX), 2004 WL 3799488, at *2 (describing pertinent terms of use for
users signing up to use Roommates.com's service). Although Roommates.com did
not screen the text of users' profiles, the service did review photographs to screen
images violating the terms of use. See id. (discussing service's attempts at screening
other forms of offensive content). The following is a sample member profile page:
The Basics
Rent: $ 800 per month + $ 800 deposit
Lease: 6 month
Date available: 09/01/04 (14 days)
Utilities included: N/A
Features: Private bedroom, Private bathroom
Residence & Vicinity
Building: House, 2 bed, 1.5 bath
2009] NOTE
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The Fair Housing Councils of San Fernando Valley and of San Diego
(Councils) filed suit against Roommates.com in a California federal court,
alleging that the Roommates.com service violated the FHA and California
housing discrimination laws due to discriminatory preferences displayed
by its users' advertisements. 76 The Councils claimed that Roommates.com
was effectively brokering housing online in a manner that otherwise would
be illegal in offline print form.7 7 The district court found Room-
mates.com immune from liability for illegal postings under § 230 of the
CDA and dismissed the claims without considering whether any of Room-
mates.com's actions had violated the FHA. 78 The district court further
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the California law
claims. 79 The Councils appealed to the Ninth Circuit, arguing wrongful
dismissal of the FHA violation claim; Roommates.com cross-appealed the
denial of its attorneys' fees.8 0
B. The Ninth Circuit Ruptures the Foundation of the
Communication Decency Act
The Ninth Circuit in Roommates.com began its analysis by turning to
§ 230 of the CDA and recognizing its guarantee of immunity for ISPs
against liability from third parties' content.8 1 The court acknowledged
Features: N/A
Location: (Central) Long Beach, CA
Household
Occupant: 1, Age 26, Male (straight)
Occupation: Student
Smoking habits: Outside smoker
Cleanliness: About average




Gender: Male (straight or gay), Female (straight or lesbian)
Smoking: Smoking okay
Cleanliness level: Clean, Average, Messy
Pets: Dog okay, Cat okay, Caged pet okay
Children: Children okay
Comments
LOOKING FOR CHILL ROOMATE [sic] TO SHARE 2 BR HOUSE
WITH DOG AND FERRET - RENT 80 0 /mo+utill. 6 mo.lease.
See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1181 n.9 (McKeown,J., dissenting) (outlining exam-
ple user profile page).
76. See id. at 1162 (majority opinion) (discussing procedural history of case).
77. See id. (explaining additional procedural history).
78. See id. (analyzing district court's holding and reasoning).
79. See id. (discussing court's reasoning for refusing to render decision on
issues pertaining to California law).
80. See id. (discussing appeal bringing case before federal circuit court).
81. See id. (describing relevant statute and its effect). For a general discussion
of the history of the Communications Decency Act, see supra notes 47-67 and ac-
companying text.
350 [Vol. 54: p. 337
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that immunity is granted only to an "information content provider," de-
fined as a person "responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of' the offending content.8 2 After briefly discussing the
background of § 230's adoption, the court turned to the Councils' three
arguments that Roommates.com violated the FHA and California law.
83
The Councils alleged that Roommates.com violated the FHA through its
use of a questionnaire, its publication of profile pages, and its encourage-
ment of its customers to use the "Additional Comments" section.
84
1. The Questionnaire
First, the Ninth Circuit addressed the Councils' argument that the
questions Roommates.com asked during the registration process violated
the FHA and California law because they required subscribers to disclose
sex, sexual orientation, and family status.85 The Councils alleged that
such questioning "indicate[d]" an intention to discriminate against cer-
tain users in violation of § 3604(c) of the FHA.8 6 The court asserted that
asking questions can be a violation of the FHA, reasoning that if it would
be illegal for a real estate broker to ask such questions in the physical
world, then those questions should not become suddenly legal when asked
in electronic form.8 7 The Roommates.com court went on to state that the
82. See id. (describing circumstances under which service provider can be im-
plicated for offensive content).
83. See id. at 1162-64 (discussing background history of § 230 and analyzing
Councils' three contentions).
84. For a general discussion of the Councils' arguments that Roommates.com
violated the FHA, see infra notes 84-106 and accompanying text.
85. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1162-64 (detailing Councils' first point of
contention). The FHA forbids any "statement ... with respect to the sale or rental
of a dwelling that indicates ... an intention to make [a] preference, limitation, or
discrimination" based on a protected status. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c). California law
forbids "any written or oral inquiry concerning the" protection of a home seeker's
status. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12955(b) (West 2005).
86. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164 (indicating actions performed by ser-
vice allegedly violated FHA). Previously, the Ninth Circuit had concluded that
tasking users to provide information about themselves and their roommate prefer-
ences was a "statement . . . with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that
indicates... an intention to make [a] preference, limitation or discrimination." Fair
Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 489 F.3d 921, 927-28
(9th Cir. 2007) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c)); see alsoJancik v. Dep't of Hous. &
Urban Dev., 44 F.3d 553, 557 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that landlord violated FHA
by indicating preference based on family status and race in both print advertise-
ments and interviews); Soules v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 967 F.2d 817, 824-
26 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding that landlord did not violate FRA because landlord's
questioning did not indicate pretextual reasoning for denial of housing).
87. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1165 (finding that asking questions elec-
tronically is sufficient to render service provider liable analogously to similar con-
duct in physical world); see also, e.g., Jancik, 44 F.3d at 557 (holding that questions
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CDA "was not meant to create a lawless no-man's-land on the Internet."88
The court therefore concluded that requiring the questionnaire was an
active act on the part of Roommates.com, thus negating any immunity that
the CDA would grant to them.89
2. The Profile Page
Second, the court addressed the Councils' charge that Room-
mates.com's compilation and publication of a profile page providing the
users' personal information was itself a violation of the FHA.90 The court
acknowledged that it was the users who provided the information, but
held that because the service helped "'develop,' at least 'in part,"' the
profile information, the ISP was thus subject to liability. 91 The court
found that unlawful questions in the questionnaire necessarily "de-
velop[ed]" unlawful answers and therefore created a discriminatory
method of conducting business. 9 2
The court discussed at length the meaning of the word "develop" as it
pertains to § 230.9 3 The court found a "passive conduit" or "co-developer"
as remaining immune to liability because such parties do not sufficiently
"develop" content.94 According to the court, however, any website that
88. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1165 (finding that Congress did not intend
for CDA to bar liability for all occurrences of illegal conduct on Internet). The
court noted that the Internet is no longer a fragile new piece of technology but has
instead become the dominant means through which commerce is conducted. See
id. at 1164 n.15 (finding that Internet no longer needs such stringent protections).
89. See id. at 1165 (summarizing conclusion to first alleged violation of FHA).
90. See id. (addressing Councils' second point of contention).
91. See id. (addressing Roommates.corn's involvement in publication process).
The court referenced its prior holding in Batzel v. Smith, where it concluded that
"the party responsible for putting information online may be subject to liability,
even if the information originated with a user." Id. (quoting Batzel v. Smith, 333
F.3d 1018, 1033 (9th Cir. 2003)). In Batzel, a defamatory email was incorrectly
forwarded to an international message board by an ISP. See Batzel, 333 F.3d at
1020-22 (outlining facts of case). The court held that despite being an ISP pursu-
ant to § 230, the poster could be liable because the email was sent from an email
address not associated with the service. See id. at 1033-35 (outlining specific cir-
cumstance causing court to find ISP liable for third-party content).
92. See Roommates.corn, 521 F.3d at 1166 (finding that Roommates.com's ques-
tions necessitated discriminatory answers that run afoul of FHA requirements).
The court likened the situation to a real estate broker saying in real life, "Tell me
whether you're Jewish or you can find yourself another broker." Id. (analogizing
Roommates.com's questioning to illegal real life situation). The court found that
where a business extracts such information as a condition to accepting clients "it is
no stretch to say that the enterprise is responsible, at least in part, for developing
that information." See id. (finding Roommates.com responsible for conditional
questions for users to create profile pages).
93. See id. at 1166-72 (finding that Roommates.com was developer of content
pursuant to under § 230).
94. See id. at 1167-68. (discussing statutory meaning of "develop" under§ 230). The court referred to the example that a user performing a search on a
search engine for a "white roommate" would not cause liability for the search en-
gine because the service did not contribute to any unlawfulness in the individual's
[Vol. 54: p. 337
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contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the content unlawfully
"develops" the content.9 5 The court found that Roommates.com's filter-
ing process, which limited search results of listings to users based on sex,
sexual orientation, and presence of children, was sufficient to constitute a
violation of the FHA.
9 6
The court differentiated the current case from its earlier holding in
Carafano, where the operator of the challenged website had little involve-
ment with the user's decision to enter information.9 7 Conversely, in Room-
conduct. See id. at 1169 (describing situation where service remains immune to
liability for unlawful activity of user). The court stated that a website owner that
corrects spelling, removes obscenity, or edits for length (provided that the edits
are unrelated to the illegality) remains immune from liability. See id. (discussing
situation where ISP remains immune from liability despite making changes to ille-
gal content).
95. See id. at 1169-70 (discussing actions sufficient to be a "developer" under
§ 230). The court iterated that the same selective criteria that is not immune for
housing services would otherwise retain immunity under § 230 for an online dat-
ing service. See id. at 1169 (noting legality of discrimination based on race, sex,
sexual preference, or amount of children in dating situations).
96. See id. (finding that service limited listings available to subscribers based
on sex, sexual orientation, and presence of children). The court maintained that
Roommates.com selectively hid certain listings based on discriminatory criteria
and therefore violated the FHA. See id. (finding that service could selectively filter
content and had ability to control postings by users). The court contrasted this
case with Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., where the service provider
Prodigy removed some but not enough of the wrongful content at issue in that
case. See id. at 1170 (finding that service provider's liability stemmed from creation
of "a website designed to solicit and enforce housing preferences that are alleged
to be illegal"). The court additionally found its reasoning consistent with its prior
decision in Batzel, where the editor of the online service made the determination
of posting defamatory content online. See id. (citing Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1033) (find-
ing that editor of message board made conscious decision to post defamatory con-
tent that was disassociated with message board itself, rendering him liable).
97. See id. at 1171-72 (finding that ISP involvement differentiated instant case
from prior holding); see also Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119,
1125 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding website not liable for user entering false information
into online dating service). In Carafano, a user entered the information of a popu-
lar actress into a dating service resulting in an abundance of harassing calls and
email to the actress's personal phone and email accounts. See id. at 1121-22
(describing background details behind Carafano). The court found that § 230 pre-
vented liability from attaching to the ISP because a profile has no content until a
user creates it. See id. at 1124 (finding that robust immunity applied to online
Internet dating service in case of fraud); see also Universal Sys. v. Lycos, Inc., 478
F.3d 413, 422 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding that third-party's defamatory comments
made without encouragement by ISP renders service immune from liability);
Green v. Am. Online, 318 F.3d 465, 470-71 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding ISP immune
from liability for derogatory comments and malicious software sent through chat
room without encouragement by the service); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am.
Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding ISP immune from liability
for relaying inaccurate stock price information received from other vendors be-
cause service did not solicit other vendors to provide inaccurate data); Zeran v.
Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332-33 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding ISP immune from
liability for defamatory and harassing message board postings because service did
not solicit or encourage wrongful postings).
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mates.com, the court found that Roommates.com had provided the
framework for improper purposes and had developed the discriminatory
questions, thus rendering the service directly involved with a system sub-
jecting users to allegedly discriminatory housing practices. 98 Further dis-
tinguishing Carafano, the court noted that "[t]he mere fact that an
interactive computer service 'classifies user characteristics ... does not
transform [it] into a developer of the underlying misinformation." 99
3. The "Additional Comments"
Finally, the court turned to the Councils' argument that any discrimi-
natory statements within the encouraged "Additional Comments" section
of the profile pages should render Roommates.com liable. 10 0 The "Addi-
tional Comments" section of the profile page provided additional and less
restrained methods for users to post discriminatory content. 10 1 The Ninth
Circuit noted that Roommates.com had encouraged users to post in the
section, and that the service posted the content in this section as written,
and lacked guidance as to what the section should contain.10 2 The court
went on to describe provocative examples of content that various users
had inserted into the "Additional Comments" section.1 0 3 Because the
98. See Roommates.corn, 521 F.3d at 1172 (finding that service elicited and ag-
gressively used "allegedly illegal content ... in conducting its business," thus pro-
viding necessary framework for improper use by users). The court noted that the
discriminatory questions and answers were "directly related to the alleged illegality
of the site." See id. (indicating connection between Roommates.com and alleged
discriminatory content).
99. See id. (distinguishing current issue with that in circuit's previous decisions
involving immunity for ISPs under § 230). The Roommates.com court mentioned
that it was adopting a common sense term of the word "develop" as specified in
§ 230. See id. (specifying court's meaning of statutory language). The court also
stated that any broader reading of the term "develop" "would sap section 230 of all
meaning." See id. (indicating effect of broad interpretation of statute).
100. See id. at 1173 (identifying court's third and final point of analysis in
determining potential liability for ISP).
101. See id. at 1173-74 (discussing "Additional Comments" section of service's
profile page). The service prompts paying subscribers to "tak[e] a moment to per-
sonalize your profile by writing a paragraph or two describing yourself and what
you are looking for in a roommate." Id. (describing Roommates.com's encourage-
ment of users to add additional optional roommate preferences). The "Additional
Comments" section is described as a blank text box allowing users to freely type
whatever they wish. See id. (discussing form of "Additional Comments" section).
102. See id. (finding that service asked subscribers to provide personal infor-
mation or preferences for potential roommates in free form). The court specifi-
cally noted that Roommates.corn made no request for any discriminatory content
to be placed in the "Additional Comments" section. See id. (indicating Room-
mates.com did not encourage users to create and post discriminatory content on
service).
103. See id. at 1173 (detailing content that users inserted into "Additional
Comments" section). One example the court gave of illicit information entered in
the "Additional Comments" section includes a user requesting that "[t]he person
applying for the room MUST be a BLACK GAY MALE." See id. (indicating poten-
tially discriminatory statement put on user profile in "Additional Comments" sec-
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content posted in the "Additional Comments" section was generally pas-
sively performed, the court ultimately found Roommates.com immune
under § 230 from any discriminatory postings in this section. 10 4
Although the Ninth Circuit found Roommates.com liable for user
content, the court nevertheless asserted that its decision preserved free-
dom of speech on the Internet while still enforcing laws such as the
FHA. 10 5 The court stated that its decision was coherent with Congress's
purpose in adopting § 230, as it was intended to encourage ISPs to provide
a "neutral tool" for posting content online, without fear of their "good
samaritan . . .screening of offensive material," creating liability for illicit
third party content. 10 6
C. Reinforcing the Communication Decency Act's Structure:
The Dissenting Opinion
Judge McKeown began his dissent to the Ninth Circuit's opinion in
Roommates.com by stating that the majority opinion's expansion of liability
for ISPs threatens to slow the "robust development" of the Internet.
10 7
Judge McKeown found that the majority opinion undermined Congress's
purpose in adopting § 230 as a means to provide "robust immunity" for
ISPs in order to prevent them from being held liable for publishing third-
tion). Other examples of statements with potentially discriminatory preferences
that have been used in the "Additional Comments" section include:
"looking for an ASIAN FEMALE OR EURO GIRL"; "I'm looking for a
straight Christian male"; "I am not looking for freaks, geeks, prostitutes
(male or female), druggies, pet cobras, drama, black muslims or mort-
gage brokers"; and "Here is free rent for the right woman . . . I would
prefer to have a Hispanic female roommate so she can make me fluent in
Spanish or an Asian female roommate just because I love Asian females."
See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, No. 03-
09386PA(RZX), 2004 WL 3799488, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2004) (outlining ex-
amples of potentially discriminatory advertisements placed by users on Room-
mates.com's service).
104. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1173-75 (finding that ISP's lack of partici-
pation in online postings renders it immune from liability for unlawful postings).
The court found that any encouragement the website gave to users to add com-
ments to the "Additional Comments" section was not sufficient to render them
liable for user content in that section. See id. at 1174 (finding that lack of encour-
agement to post discriminatory comments maintained ISP's immunity from liabil-
ity for comments). The court also asserted that it would be impossible to
distinguish unlawful discriminatory preferences in the "Additional Comments" sec-
tion without reviewing every essay. See id. at 1174 (finding difficulty for ISP to filter
user content on large scale).
105. See id. at 1175 (justifying court's decision as consistent with Congress's
intent in adopting § 230).
106. See id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006)) (summarizing that § 230 pro-
vides immunity to ISPs only when website provides "neutral" tools for users to cre-
ate content).
107. See id. at 1176 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (declaring that expansion of
liability for ISPs is harmful to Internet's future growth).
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party content. 10 8 As Judge McKeown argued, though traditional publish-
ers retained liability for similar publishing acts in the real world, Congress
through § 230 specifically chose to treat ISPs differently by providing them
with immunity. 10 9
The dissent acknowledged that the adopters of § 230 did not envision
today's technologies, but reasoned that Congress's intentions remained as
applicable today as in the mid-1990s." ° Judge McKeown stated that the
Ninth Circuit, as well as a majority of other circuits, has recognized the
"robust" immunity that § 230 provides to ISPs.1 II Therefore,Judge McKe-
108. See id. (finding that expansion of liability for ISPs is contrary to Con-
gress's intent in adopting § 230).
109. See id. at 1176-77 (acknowledging difference in treatment for ISPs).
Judge McKeown recalled the Ninth Circuit's decision in Batzel v. Smith, where the
court explained:
[Section] 230(c) (1) overrides the traditional treatment of publishers, dis-
tributors, and speakers under statutory and common law. As a matter of
policy, "Congress decided not to treat providers of interactive computer
services like other information providers such as newspapers, magazines
or television and radio stations . Congress . . . has chosen to treat
cyberspace differently.
Id. at 1176 (quoting Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 2003)).
110. See id. at 1176-77 (acknowledging that surge in technology has made to-
day's Internet "a far cry from web technology in the mid-1990s").
111. See id. at 1179-80 (describing differential treatment given to ISPs); see also
Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519
F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that an online information system must not
"be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by" someone
else); Universal Commc'n Sys. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 420 (1st Cir. 2007)
(finding that "notice of the unlawful nature of the information provided on the
Internet is not enough to make it the service provider's own speech"); Green v.
Am. Online, 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding that § 230 "'precludes
courts from entertaining claims that would place a computer service provider in a
publisher's role,' and therefore bars 'lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider
liable for its exercise of a publisher's traditional editorial functions-such as decid-
ing whether to publish, withdraw, postpone, or alter content'" (quoting Zeran v.
Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997))); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co.,
Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 984-85 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding that § 230
"creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would hold service provid-
ers liable for information originating with a third party") (emphasis added); Zeran,
129 F.3d at 330 (holding that § 230 was "enacted... to maintain the robust nature
of Internet communication and, accordingly, to keep government interference in
the medium to a minimum"); see also Whitney Info. Network, Inc. v. Xcentric Ven-
tures, No. 2:04-cv-47-FtM-34SPC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11632, at *35-36 (M.D. Fla.
Feb. 15, 2008) (finding immunity for website that provided template for users to
classify consumers' complaints for companies such as "con artists" or "corrupt com-
panies"); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 851-52 (W.D. Tex. 2007)
(finding immunity for ISP for not preventing user from posting false age informa-
tion and resulting in sexual assault), aff'd, 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008), cert. denied,
129 S. Ct. 600 (2008); Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090,
1118 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (holding ISP not liable for postings of copyright owner's
photos online); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 50-53 (D.D.C. 1998) (find-
ing ISP not liable for defamation stemming from comments provided by user of
service); Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 529 (Cal. 2006) (finding ISP immune
from liability from alleged libel by maliciously distributing statements in e-mails
[Vol. 54: p. 337
20
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol54/iss2/5
20091 NoTE
own declared that the court should not make the policy decision of
whether § 230(c) (1) trumps the FHA, but rather should leave such ajudg-
ment to Congress.
1 12
Additionally, Judge McKeown asserted that the majority misapplied
the terms "interactive computer service" and "information content pro-
vider."' 13 An interactive computer service is not liable as a "publisher" of
information supplied by an information content provider.1 14 The dissent
found that because a third-party provided the information, the webhost
should not be liable for any inflammatory content posted by the third-
party.1 15 According to the dissent, Roommates.com's users were therefore
"information content providers" because they created the information in
their profiles and, at their option, added information as to their room-
mate preference.
1 16
Moreover, Judge McKeown concluded that providing drop-down
menus for users to enter information did not "develop" the information,
as the users still chose the content they entered themselves.'1 7 Even if the
and Internet postings); Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 717-18 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002) (holding that imposition of liability on ISP for failing to provide certifi-
cate of authenticity with collectables was inconsistent with § 230); Schneider v. Am-
azon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 4243 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (holding ISP immune
from liability for negative comments about author posted on site by visitors to
website).
112. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1177 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (stating
that determination of ISP liability under FHA is policy decision best reserved for
Congress).
113. See id. at 1180-82 (finding that users were "information content provid-
ers" whereas Roommates.com was "interactive computer service"). The CDA de-
fines an "interactive computer service" as "any information service, system, or
access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple
users to a computer server . . ." 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2006). An information
content provider is defined as "any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or
in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the In-
ternet or any other interactive computers service." § 230(f)(3). Judge McKeown
stated that the users solely create the profiles without intervention by the service
and therefore are the "information content providers." See Roommates.com, 521
F.3d at 1182 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (asserting that only creators of profiles can
legitimately qualify as "information content providers"). The dissent additionally
noted that in the twelve years since the CDA's enactment, reviewing courts had
"adopt[ed] a relatively expansive definition of 'interactive computer service' and a
relatively restrictive definition of 'information content provider.'" See id. at 1180
(quoting Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003)).
114. See§ 230(c) (1) (stating that "[n]o provider or user of an interactive com-
puter service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information pro-
vided by another information content provider").
115. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1180-82 (McKeown, J., dissenting)
(describing process by which users create content on site).
116. See id. at 1182 (finding that users identify information that they choose to
display and are thus sole creators of that provided information).
117. See id. at 1181-82 (asserting that Roommates.com is not "developer" as
specified in § 230). The dissent argued that providing a form with standardized
answers does not "develop" the answers, and without the user's participation, there
would be no information presented at all. See id. (finding that providing users
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drop-down menus were interpreted as encouraging information from
users, the CDA does not bar immunity from encouragement or solicitation
of such information.' 18 Finally, Judge McKeown asserted that the ramifi-
cations of the majority's decision would be far reaching and would chill
speech on the Internet, interactive computer services, and other interac-
tive media. 119
V. THE NINTH CIRCUIT BRAis GROUND BUT HOBBLES THE
COMMUNICATION DECENCY Acr's BROAD IMMUNITY
Until Roommates.com, a vast majority of courts recognized and en-
forced the "robust immunity" provided to ISPs. 120 The Ninth Circuit's
holding in Roommates.com has thus created a new precedent that conflicts
with the majority of case law stemming from both its own decisions and
those of other circuits. 12 1 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit's holding in
standardized options does not constitute "development" of information). The dis-
sent additionally stated that the process of searching, sorting, and transmitting
user information, without altering the content, cannot transform the service into
an "information content provider." See id. at 1184-85 (noting that management of
information is not sufficient to create liability for ISP); see also Carafano, 339 F.3d at
1124-25 (finding that "classif[ying] user characteristics into discrete categories and
collect[ing] responses to specific essay questions does not transform [the ISP] into
a 'developer' of the 'underlying misinformation'"); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129
F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that attempts "to hold a service provider
liable for its exercise of a publisher's traditional editorial functions-such as decid-
ing whether to publish, withdraw, postpone, or alter content-are barred"); Gen-
try v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 706 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that
compiling false or misleading content created by users does not transform ISP into
Internet content provider).
118. See Roommates.corn, 521 F.3d at 1185 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (conclud-
ing that encouraging entries of specific user information was not sufficient to
render ISP as creator of such content); see also Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp.
44, 52 (D.D.C. 1998) ("Congress has made a different policy choice by providing
immunity even where the interactive service provider has an active, even aggressive
role in making available content prepared by others.") (emphasis added).
119. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1187-89. (McKeownJ., dissenting) (argu-
ing that majority's decision will hinder Internet's development and growth).
Judge McKeown argued that the majority's decision would open every interactive
website to liability for soliciting and sorting information. See id. at 1188-89 (finding
limitless potential of liability for websites with users entering information).
120. For a general discussion of court decisions finding immunity for ISPs,
see supra note 97 and accompanying text.
121. Compare Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1167-68 (finding an exception to
CDA immunity where an ISP contributes in part to objectionable content posted
on Internet), with Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124 (holding that "so long as a third party
willingly provides the essential published content, the interactive service provider
receives full immunity regardless of the specific editing or selection process") (emphasis
added); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (finding that § 230 provided immunity to service
providers from liability for each message republished by their services to prevent
them from having to restrict number and type of messages posted); Batzel v.
Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding "critical in applying [§ 230 is]
the concern that lawsuits could threaten the 'freedom of speech in the new and
burgeoning Internet medium.'" (quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330)).
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Craigslist represents the archetypal methodology and interpretation of
§ 230 as it applies to ISPs and discriminatory housing postings.' 22
A. The Seventh Circuit Hit the Nail on the Head in Craigslist
The Seventh Circuit in Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law v. Craigslist also heard a case involving a similar accusation of F1HA
violations against an ISP, yet it reached a far different conclusion than that
of the Ninth Circuit in Roommates.com. 12 3 The Seventh Circuit case was
brought against Craigslist, an ISP that provides, among other things, an
online bulletin board for people to buy, sell, or rent housing services.
124
The issue in Craigslist arose out of the defendant's advertisement creation
process, which required users to enter both suggested and required fields
comprising the content of the post, including price, location, contact, and
description.1
25
The Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law (Law-
yers' Committee) filed suit against Craigslist for notices posted by users
that were allegedly in violation of the FHA.126 Craigslist responded by
122. See Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law v. Craigslist, 519
F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that broad interpretation of § 230 prevented
Craigslist from assuming liability for its users discriminatory housing postings); see
also Universal Commc'n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 422 (1st Cir. 2007)
(finding broad immunity granted to Lycos despite facilitating defamatory postings
of others on Internet); Green v. Am. Online, 318 F.3d 465, 473 (3d Cir. 2003)
(finding that broad reading of § 230 protected America Online from liability from
bulk and unsolicited email); Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1036 (holding that broad reading
of § 230 rendered e-mail newsletter operator as immune from liability); Ben Ezra,
Weinstein & Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 987-88 (10th Cir. 2000) (using
broad interpretation of § 230 to find America Online immune from defamation
charges arising out of users' content); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 335 (finding that § 230
plainly immunized ISPs like America Online for information that originated with
third parties).
123. Compare Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 671-72 (finding protection for online ser-
vice provider from being treated as publisher or speaker of any information pro-
vided by someone else), with Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1175-76 (finding that CDA
does not provide immunity to online service provider for discriminatory content
when service provides assistance in creating content).
124. See Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 668 (describing how Craigslist's service is used
for advertising purposes). Craigslist provides classifieds and allows advertising for
a variety of services to more than 550 cities in over fifty countries. See Craigslist
factsheet, http://www.craigslist.org/about/factsheet (last visited Mar. 3, 2009).
There are more than fifty million users and twelve billion page views on the Craig-
slist service each month. See id. (outlining vast amount of user traffic on Craigslist
service).
125. See Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craig-
slist, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 681, 684-85 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (describing user website
creation process on Craigslist service). When an individual accesses Craigslist seek-
ing to purchase or rent and searches for criteria or preferences on Craigslist's
website, they reach the seller or renter's page and obtain the necessary contact
information. See id. at 685 (describing how potential customers meet sellers or
renters through Craigslist's service).
126. See Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 668 (outlining bases for action against Craig-
slist); see also 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (banning housing notices that indicate prefer-
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asserting that whether the content was objectionable under the FHA was
irrelevant, as § 230 of the CDA provided "broad immunity from liability
for unlawful third-party content."1 2
7
The Seventh Circuit in Craigslist identified the issue as whether Con-
gress intended § 3604 to be excluded from the reach of § 230.128 The
court declared that although the reasoning behind the adoption of § 230
was to provide immunity for ISPs that selectively filtered illicit content, the
scope of a law will often differ from its genesis and provide greater
protection. 129
Though Craigslist undoubtedly played a causal role in providing the
forum for discrimination, the Seventh Circuit concluded that such role
was not sufficient to render the service a "cause" of discrimination as speci-
fied in § 3604(c). 130 Additionally, the service did nothing to induce its
users to express a preference for discrimination, such as offering a lower
price to people who include discriminatory content in their postings.1 3
1
ence based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national
origin). Some of the notices on Craigslist include phrases such as "NO MINORI-
TIES" and "No children." See Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under
Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 681, 685-86 (N.D. 111. 2006) (citing
examples of illicit postings on Craigslist that potentially violated FHA). The Law-
yers' Committee argued that an information content provider must perform
"blocking and screening" or all of § 230(c) would be irrelevant. See Craigslist, 519
F.3d at 669 (describing Lawyers' Committee's argument against allowing immunity
to apply to Craigslist).
127. See Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 669 (arguing for immunity from liability for
third-party content for ISPs under § 230). Craigslist also asserted that the effort to
filter or screen the discriminatory content either by automated efforts or through
human labor would be unnecessary due to the immunity provision in § 230. See id.
(arguing that ISPs do not need to perform "blocking and screening"); see also 47
U.S.C. § 230(c) (declaring that "[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider").
128. See Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 671 (finding that Congress writes general stat-
utes to avoid considering all potential sources of liability); see also Regional Rail
Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 144 (1974) (concluding that legislation
does not need to think about subject for law to affect it and that effect of general
rules continues unless limited by superseding enactments).
129. See Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 671 (noting that broad interpretation is appro-
priate for statute not necessarily adopted for purpose at hand). Additionally, the
court noted that the statute uses the word "information," which encompasses a
broad range of material, rather than a more specific phrase such as "sexually ori-
ented material." See id. (recognizing broad approach Congress used in phrasing
§ 230).
130. See id. at 671 (finding Craigslist's level of contribution in any discrimina-
tory postings to be insufficient to hold service liable as developer of discriminatory
content). The court noted that it would be similarly absurd to claim that people
who save money in a bank "cause" a bank robbery because without banks there
would be no bank robberies. See id. (indicating that calling ISPs "the cause" of
harm points blame at wrong parties).
131. See id. at 671-72 (finding lack of inducement to make discriminatory
statements as evidence of non-causal role in posting of statements). The court
asserted that if Craigslist were to be held liable for "causing" the discriminatory
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Finally, the court asserted that rather than sue the service, the Lawyers'
Committee could identify and track down any landlords or owners who
engage in discrimination, and prosecute them directly. 132
The primary difference between Roommates.com and Craigslist stems
from the differing methods that the two websites use to obtain informa-
tion from their users. 133 Roommates.com's drop-down menus, with built-
in answers allowing users to transmit potentially discriminatory content,
proved to be the Ninth Circuit's primary reason in finding Room-
mates.com at fault.134 In contrast, Craigslist's method of free posting al-
lowed entry of content without the service's assistance, similar to the
"Additional Comments" section in Roommates.com's profile creation
page. 135
Yet although Roommates.com provided the drop-down answers, it was
still the Roommates.com users, rather than the service, who chose the con-
tent of their profiles. 136 The users themselves were creating the content,
notices, then the firms that create the computers and software should be as well.
See id. at 672 (finding that holding ISPs liable for third-party content creates end-
less source of liability for anyone else providing means for people to create illicit
content).
132. See id. at 672 (noting that anyone experiencing discrimination through
online housing services has other available methods for seeking justice); see also
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373-74 (1982) (holding that "test-
ers" experiencing discriminatory housing practices still have standing to sue under
FHA's provisions); Gladstone, Realtors v. Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 102-03 (1979)
(holding that plaintiff need not be "person aggrieved" to have standing to sue for
violations of Civil Rights Act).
133. Compare Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1165 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)
(stating that service required users to specify, using drop-down menu personal in-
formation), with Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v.
Craigslist, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 681, 684-85 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (requiring users to
submit information into required fields that list rent or price, specific and general
location, title of advertisement, contact email address, and description, with capa-
bility to add pictures).
134. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1169-70 (finding that "Roommate's con-
nection to the discriminatory filtering process is direct and palpable: Roommate
designed its search and email systems to limit the listings available to subscribers
based on sex, sexual orientation and presence of children."). The court found
that the website's selection process was designed in a manner that solicited and
enforced housing preferences alleged to be illegal. See id. at 1170 (indicating that
website's design mandated liability for any discriminatory content).
135. See Craigslist, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 685-86 (allowing users to freely enter
user information without any predetermined answers); see also Roommates.com, 521
F.3d at 1173-74 (finding that "Additional Comments" section "does not provide
any specific guidance as to what the essay should contain, nor does it urge sub-
scribers to input discriminatory preferences").
136. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1182 (McKeown,J., dissenting) (declaring
that "[t]he profile is created solely by the user, not the provider of the website").
The Ninth Circuit has already found that merely "selecting material for publica-
tion" does not constitute "development" of information. See Batzel v. Smith, 333
F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that development of information requires
actions more substantial than merely editing and selecting material). Similarly, in
Donato v. Moldow, a New Jersey state appellate court determined that a message
2009] NOTE
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without encouragement from the service as to what specific content they
should enter. -1 3 7 Further, the service made no proven attempt to solicit or
persuade users to enter information containing discriminatory content.'1
3 8
Any alleged discriminatory preferences posted online therefore began and
ended with the users; the Roommates.com service merely provided a
means for the users to publish the content.' 3 9
B. A House Divided
The Ninth Circuit's holding has created confusion in the formerly
stable interpretation of the CDA. 140 Judge McKeown, in his dissent in
Roommates.com, correctly argued that the Ninth Circuit's majority holding
misguidedly fused the publisher's role and the developer's role in an on-
line service's publication process.141 In finding that Roommates.corn par-
tially created the alleged discriminatory content, the Ninth Circuit pushed
the boundary of "developer" as defined in § 230.142 Such a commingling
board operator was immune under § 230, despite the plaintiff's argument that the
operator controlled the illegal content through highlighting and deleting certain
messages. See 865 A.2d 711, 725-26 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (finding that
"selectively choosing which messages to delete and which to leave posted" on mes-
sage board was "exercise of a publisher's traditional editorial functions, namely,
whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content provided by others").
137. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1161 (stating that it is users that choose
preferences in their roommates).
138. See id. at 1178 (McKeown,J., dissenting) (noting that "there has been no
determination that Roommate's questions or standardized answers are illegal").
139. See id. at 1181 (stating that "Roommate's users ... are responsible for
creating the information in their user profiles and, at their option-not the web-
site's choice-in expressing preferences as to roommate characteristics"). For in-
stance, when a user identifies himself as a "Straight male" from the service's drop-
down menu, it is the user that has "identified himself and provided that informa-
tion to Roommate to publish." Id. at 1182 (indicating that users are sole creators
of information published on Roommates.com's website).
140. See Sussman, supra note 9, at 207 (finding uniformity across court
interpretations).
141. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1177 (McKeown,J., dissenting) (declaring
that "the majority rewrites the statute with its definition of 'information content
provider,' labels the search function 'information development,' and strips interac-
tive service providers of immunity"). Judge McKeown indicated that violating the
FHA is completely distinct from the issue of whether the service provider is enti-
tled to immunity under the CDA. See id. (asserting that "[w]hether the informa-
tion at issue is unlawful and whether the webhost has contributed to its
unlawfulness are issues analytically independent of the determination of
immunity").
142. See id. at 1181-82 (arguing that service is not "developer" in statutory
sense). Judge McKeown asserted that there were two reasons why a close reading
of the statute would render Roommates.com not an information content provider:
"(1) providing a drop-down menu does not constitute 'creating' or 'developing'
information; and (2) the structure and text of the statute make plain that Congress
intended to immunize Roommate's sorting, displaying, and transmitting of third-
party information." See id. at 1182 (discussing dissent's interpretation of statute).
The Ninth Circuit itself has stated that providing pre-prepared responses for In-
ternet users to enter information does not render an ISP to be an Internet content
[Vol. 54: p. 337
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of roles creates confusion as to what level of assistance online services may
provide for users to develop their content without the services becoming
"developers" of the content themselves.
14 3
The confusion created by the Roommates.com decision will likely lead
to an increase in litigation until the boundaries of the ISP's role are more
clearly defined. 144 The affected sites will not only be limited to those pro-
viding housing services, but also to social networking sites such as MyS-
pace, online auction sites such as eBay, blogging sites such as LiveJournal,
and even major ISPs such as AOL. 1 45
Moreover, in passing § 230, Congress expressly stated its intention to
promote the "vibrant and competitive free market ... that exists for the
Internet ... unfettered by Federal or State regulation." 14 6 Additionally,
Congress plainly illustrated its objective: "to promote the continued devel-
opment and growth of the Internet and other interactive computer ser-
vices." 147 Thus, finding Roommates.com, or any other online service
provider, liable for content created by a third party is in direct conflict
with Congress's purpose and goals in adopting the statute. 148 Further-
more, because the statute represents Congress's attempt to tackle both a
national and international issue, the courts' narrow reading of § 230
would effectively diminish Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause. 1
4 9
provider. See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir.
2003) (finding that ISP lacked responsibility for illegal content despite providing
menu of pre-prepared responses to users).
143. See Cecilia Ziniti, Note, The Optimal Liability System for Online Service Provid-
ers: How Zeran v. America Online Got It Right and Web 2.0 Proves It, 23 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 583, 598 (2008) (describing over-precaution that will be practiced by
risk averse ISPs due to confusion of roles). For example, a service may provide its
users only the simplest possible tools for the creation of content as to avoid being
labeled a "developer" and thereby risk liability for the users' published content.
See id. (detailing example action potentially taken by ISP due to confusion as to
which tools given to subscribers would render service liable for subscribers'
content).
144. See Burns, supra note 4, at 84-85 (discussing legal ramifications resulting
from holding ISPs liable for third-party content in some situations but not in
others).
145. See id. (discussing widespread consequences that liability will have by af-
fecting all forms of Internet services).
146. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b).
147. See id. (detailing Congress's goal in adopting legislation to promote fu-
ture growth of Internet).
148. See id. § 230(b)(1) (stating Congress's broad goals "to promote the con-
tinued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services"); see
also id. § 230(b) (2) (stating that statute was adopted "to preserve the vibrant and
competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive
computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation").
149. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 334 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding
that restrictive reading of § 230 would lessen Congress's ability to command in
field whose international character is apparent). The Commerce Clause specifi-
cally gives Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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C. The Internet's Protective Shelter is Left Leaking
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Roommates.com made small strides in
protecting fair housing while greatly hampering the potential growth of
the Internet.150 There is valid apprehension among commentators that
the Internet will be a place of refuge for all individuals seeking to practice
discrimination in housing, as well as in other forums. 15 1 Housing discrim-
ination continues to permeate our society and there is no doubt that the
FHA is an important piece of legislation for providing a remedy for these
crimes.1 52 Furthermore, the Internet provides tools that potentially allow
individuals to practice discrimination on a far greater scale than ever
before, reaching an ever larger number of people. 15 3 Without a remedy
for individuals whose rights have been infringed, the concern that the In-
ternet could potentially be a safe haven for all violators of statues such as
the FHA is legitimate. 15 4 Nevertheless, those individuals experiencing dis-
150. See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (adopted "to preserve the vibrant and competitive
free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer
services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation").
151. See, e.g., Sussman, supra note 9, at 217 (arguing that "progeny of cases
dealing with immunity under the CDA continue[s] to grow to the detriment of
plaintiffs facing discrimination."). But see Chang, supra note 7, at 1012 (arguing
that given "legislative silence and the complete absence of an insurmountable con-
flict between the two statutes, the CDA cannot be applied to create a safe haven for
housing discrimination on the Internet").
152. See, e.g., Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 1005 (2d Cir. 1991) (find-
ing that FHA was adopted to prevent racially motivated advertisements that in-
clude those with only white models indicating racial preference); United States v.
Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 210-11 (4th Cir. 1972) (finding that "publication of discrimi-
natory classified advertisements in newspapers was precisely one of the evils the Act
was designed to correct"); Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(finding that restrictive covenant was racially motivated and therefore surely fell in
line with goals that FHA was adopted to prevent). For a comprehensive look at
how housing discrimination continues to pervade in the United States today de-
spite the enforcement of the FHA, see Rubinowitz & Alsheik, supra note 37, at 903-
12.
153. SeeACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp 824, 837 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (acknowledging
that "Web publishing is simple enough that thousands of individual users and
small community organizations are using the Web to publish their own personal
'home pages,' the equivalent of individualized newsletters about that person or
organization, which are available to everyone on the Web"). Many publishers at-
tempt to disseminate their information to the widest possible audience on the In-
temet. See id. (discussing methods publishers implement to reach wider
audiences).
154. See, e.g., Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329-30 n.1 (finding that plaintiff was unable to
identify original offending party due to AOL's failure to maintain adequate
records of its users). Despite some victims being incapable of recovering for harms
in the online world, free speech often restricts individuals from recovery from
harms in the offline world as well. See, e.g., Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814
F.2d 1017, 1025 (5th Cir. 1987) (preventing plaintiffs from recovering from maga-
zine for incitement due to death of teenager practicing auto-erotic asphyxiation
described in magazine); Olivia N. v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888, 892 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1981) (restricting plaintiffs from recovering from television show produc-
ers for rape that perpetrators performed based on television show).
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crimination, as well as groups promoting equal rights, are not without a
means to enforce the FA, and may still employ methods to track down
the individual authors of discriminatory postings to seek civil remedies. 155
Although suing the landlord or seller directly would remove the ISP's
deeper pockets from involvement, holding individual users responsible
would appropriately punish the party actually causing the harm.' 56
Additionally, finding ISPs liable for acts of third parties carries with it
an unjustifiable encumbrance on free speech on the Internet. 1 57 Due to
fear of potential liability, online service providers may increasingly limit
their services to avoid any association with the customers' content. 158
Also, larger services, such as search engines, could be hamstrung from
providing helpful search results for fear of being deemed a "publisher" of
the search result content that reaches the user. 159
Moreover, the uncertainty as to liability created by the Ninth Circuit
will lead to online services "over-complying" with the standard, leading to
a decrease in innovative and beneficial services in the future.' 60 Fewer
online service providers will implement publishing capabilities for their
155. See Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craig-
slist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2008) (discussing various methods that can
be implemented to collect damages from landlords or owners who engage in dis-
criminatory conduct); see also Sussman, supra note 9, at 217 (conceding that "fair
housing still remains the law of the land and is still enforceable through civil
actions").
156. See Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 672 (stating that "given § 230(c) (1) [one] can-
not sue the messenger because the message reveals a third party's plan to engage
in unlawful discrimination"). The Craigslist court stated that if Craigslist "causes"
the discriminatory notices, then so do phone companies and courier services, yet
no one would contend that they would be liable for "causing" discriminatory adver-
tisements. See id. (arguing that suing messenger is placing blame on wrong party).
157. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (recognizing that Congress's primary intention
in passing § 230 was to avoid chilling effects on free speech stemming from ex-
tending tort liability to ISPs).
158. See Ziniti, supra note 143, at 613 (arguing that not precluding distributor
liability "would force a reversion to the 'walled garden'-style Internet services of the
late 1990s in which portal sites like AOL strived to keep users within their world
and keep others' content out"); see also Michael Geist, Pull Down the Walled Gardens,
BBC NEWS, Aug. 15, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/technology/
6944653.stm (discussing problems with social networking sites creating only local-
ized communities or "Walled Gardens").
159. See Ziniti, supra note 143, at 610 (arguing that "Internet search is inher-
ently editorial-even if algorithms do the editing-because it involves content-
based decision-making as to relevance, display and usability" and "bias against edi-
torial functions in determining liability thus risk hindering search").
160. See Hamdani, supra note 5, at 905 (arguing that "holding ISPs strictly
liable for the full social harm produced by user misconduct would induce them to
adopt excessive levels of monitoring and employ overly zealous censorship poli-
cies"); see also Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (noting that when "[flaced with potential
liability for each message republished by their services, interactive computer ser-
vice providers might choose to severely restrict the number and type of messages
posted); Ziniti, supra note 143, at 607 (stating that "to avoid liability, companies
would err on silencing speech").
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users, thus curtailing much of the creative and social potential of the In-
ternet. 1 61 Unfortunately, difficult tradeoffs are often necessary to justify
the protection of fundamental rights, with many individuals suffering
harm in the name of free speech. 162 Yet the fundamental right of free
speech does need protection, especially because the Internet provides a
massive forum for individuals to express themselves and practice free
speech. 1
63
Finally, there are financial and privacy consequences to Internet users
stemming from the loss of immunity for ISPs. 1 64 ISP liability will precipi-
tate increased costs for filtering user postings; users will bear those costs in
the form of increased subscription fees. 16 5 Additionally, users will face
privacy problems if ISPs are forced to monitor and screen their con-
tent.16 6 Those arguing against immunity contend that ISPs should not
profit from third-party content, including obscene postings, while en-
joying freedom from liability for that content. 167 The Internet is not
161. See Ziniti, supra note 143, at 600-01 (stating that effect that some provid-
ers will avoid creating new Web 2.0 services to avoid liability potentially cuts off the
"long tail" and eliminates much of the social value of the Web 2.0). One commen-
tator argues that under a regime where ISPs would face massive payouts, "the In-
ternet might be about where digital cable systems are, with lots of downstream
content and very little opportunity for interactivity, much less individual publish-
ing." SeeJim Harper, Against ISP Liability, 28 REG. 30, 32 (2005), available at http://
ssm.com/abstract=807545 (arguing that ISPs should not be "liable for copyright
violation, obscenity, and defamatory statements put out by their clients").
162. See Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1321,
1322 (1992) (arguing that "[i]f free speech benefits us all, then ideally we all ought
to pay for it, not only those who are the victims of harmful speech"); Ziniti, supra
note 143, at 614 (declaring that protecting free speech "can sometimes result in
unfortunate victims, who, especially when the original provider of the information
at issue evades identification, pay the price for the free speech and growth" that
broad immunity enables); see also id. (recognizing that "the Supreme Court has
explained that free speech is paramount to American democracy").
163. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (noting that Congress specifically wanted to
avoid "the specter of tort liability in an area of such prolific speech" and "obvious
chilling effect" such liability would have on Internet); see also 47 U.S.C. § 230 (seek-
ing "to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for
the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or
State regulation").
164. For a general discussion of liability determination of ISPs from an eco-
nomic standpoint, see Matthew Schruers, The History and Economics of ISP Liability
for Third Party Content, 88 VA. L. REv. 205, 206-08 (2002). For a general discussion
of privacy issues stemming from ISP liability, see Harper, supra note 161, at 31.
165. See Schruers, supra note 164, at 207 (stating that "[r]elative to the availa-
ble alternatives, the current regime, in which ISPs are almost completely immune,
is the most efficient").
166. See Harper, supra note 161, at 31 (arguing that "[p]art of what users bar-
gain for when they engage an ISP is privacy: the assurance that the data they trans-
mit will not be monitored, copied, held in storage, or shared beyond what is
necessary to provide good service and comply with law").
167. See Siva Vaidhyanathan, Me, 'Person of the Year'? No Thanks, MSNBC, Dec.
28, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16371425/ (arguing that "Google, for
instance, only makes money because it harvests, copies, aggregates, and ranks bil-
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alone in this context, however; print distributors such as booksellers and
phone companies likewise retain relaxed liability standards, while also
profiting from third-party content in the process.
168
V. CONCLUSION
The rapid growth and the quick dissemination of information on the
Internet will always be a key difference that distinguishes it from print me-
dia. 16 9 Congress expressly showed its recognition of this distinction when
it passed § 230, aiming to protect the Internet's growth and minimize reg-
ulation. 17 1 Although promoting equal housing opportunities will always
be a concern of utmost importance in the United States, it makes little
sense to hold ISPs responsible for the discriminatory conduct of relatively
few third-party users.
17 1
ISPs provide extremely valuable utilities, creating forums for people
to freely express themselves and engage in commerce with unprecedented
ease.i 72 Though the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Roommates.com represents
a small limitation to the prevailing broad interpretation of § 230, it poses
significant risks of further attacks on services that provide valuable tools
for their users. 173 Such constraint presents a grim forecast, decreasing the
lions of Web contributions by millions of authors who unknowingly grant Google
the right to capitalize or 'free ride,' on their work").
168. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling
Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1049,
1074 (2000) (noting that despite fact that companies "free ride" and enrich them-
selves without compensation to those who enrich them, "[t]his... cannot be the
justification for restricting speech").
169. See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 49 (D.D.C. 1998) (recogniz-
ing "the speed with which information may be disseminated and the near impossi-
bility of regulating information content" on Internet).
170. See id. (noting that "Congress decided not to treat providers of interac-
tive computer services like other information providers such as newspaper
magazines or television and radio stations, all of which may be held liable for pub-
lishing or distributing obscene or defamatory material written or prepared by
others").
171. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1176-77 (9th
Cir. 2008) (en banc) (McKeown, J., dissenting) (deeming it inappropriate to join
ISPs "at the hip with third-party users, [where] they rise and fall together in liabil-
ity for Internet sortings and postings").
172. See Kurth, supra note 10, at 819 (noting that "the sheer number of World
Wide Web pages, chat rooms, e-mail 'list servs,' message boards and other forms of
interactive communication provide unprecedented ability to exercise free speech
of unlimited scope").
173. See Ziniti, supra note 143, at 595 (arguing that Internet services without
immunity will face "draining legal battles to which they would react in predictable
ways-diminishing the value and promise of Web 2.0").
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beneficial functions that ISPs may provide while diminishing free speech
in the online world.' 74
Adam Weintraub
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174. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding
that Congress chose to immunize ISPs after recognizing that "[t]he specter of tort
liability in an area of such prolific speech would have an obvious chilling effect").
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